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A b s tr a c t
This paper presents a structural model of intra-European air­
line competition. Using a two countries/two airlines (flag-carriers) 
framework, three different competitive scenarios are analysed. These 
scenarios reflect the new E C  competition rules. The results sug­
gest that, when flag-carriers operate hub-and-spoke networks, the 
potential welfare gains arising with the abandoning of collusive 
practices are significant throughout the network. In addition, 
the model shows that, with increasing returns to density, a cross- 
border merger between two flag-carriers m ay increase the net social 
welfare throughout the network. Consequently, the threat of m o­
nopolisation through merger should not be of primary concern to  
E C  antitrust authorities. (JEL L13.L 43,L93)
*1 am grateful to Steven Martin and Andrzej Baniak for their useful comments. M\ 
special thanks go to Louis Phlips for encouraging discussions and valuable suggestions 























































































































































































’’ ...Because carriers produce their ”output” by operating over a 
network, it stands to reason that the only way to examine the effects 




Given inherited regulations and European airline industry specificities 
how should the potential benefits stemming from the new regulatory en­
vironment be evaluated ? What airline EC merger policy would be more 
appropriate ? These are the main questions I aim to answer in this paper. 
To this end. I suggest the analysis of a structural model of intra-European 
airline competition1 that is able to take the main characteristics of this 
industry into account: the new EC com petition  rules2 and the struc­
ture o f  E uropean  airline networks.
Various researchers have stressed the importance of networking and 
multiproduct aspects in airline economics (see Sarndal V Statton [1975]. 
Pavaux [1984]. Caves et al. [1984], etc.). Recently. Brueckner k  Spiller 
[1991] provided an analytical framework to study the effect of competition 
in airline hub-and-spoke networks. My aim is to extend their approach to 
a two country/two airline model. In fact, while Brueckner k  Spiller [1991], 
analyse the effect of an exogenous change in the number of firms serving a 
particular market, this paper is an attempt to analyse the possible effects 
and the social welfare consequences of the gradual European airline liber­
alisation. In particular, the model presents various competition scenarios, 
going from explicit cartel agreement toward more competitive behaviour.
^ n l y  flag-carriers operating scheduled air passengers services are considered in this 
paper.
2From 1988, as an attempt to promote competition in intra-EC air transport, 
the Commission gradually introduced three packages of measures, containing regu­
lations concerning competition rules (their enforcement and permissible exemptions), 
fares, market access, and licensing. The First Package is published in OJ L374, No 
3975 /87 /E E C , 31.12.87. The Second Package, in OJ L217, No 2342,2343/90/E E C . 




























































































Finally, the model offers some insights on the important merger issue. 
Nowadays, it seems clear that the future of the European airline industry 
will depend, to a large extent, on a successful EC merger policy.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section II, I specify the as­
sumptions and set up the model. In Section III and Section IV, I present 
the collusive agreement and the ’’ competitive” solutions, respectively.' 
Section V  provides a comparison between both solutions. The merger 
solution is proposed in Section VI and Section VII provides a compar­
ison between the merger and the ’’ competitive” solutions. Section VIII 
concludes.
II Assumptions and Model Set-up
The model is based on the following assumptions. The first three are 
derived from the network characteristics and the regulatory regimes. A 
tractable model calls for the last assumption.
1. The hub-and-spoke3 network is exogenously given to both airlines, 
(flag-carriers). In a dynamic perspective, it is clear that the route 
structure is a key endogenous variable4.
2. Each flag-carrier is a m onopolist in its ’’hinterland’' or protected 
market niche. Consequently, each airline has the monopoly of tw o 
purely domestic routes. This assumption reflects the fact that pre­
vious bilateral agreements did not make provision for the so-called 
cabotage rights, i.e., the ability to carry passengers within a coun­
try by an airline of another country with the origin/destination in 
its home country5. (Complete cabotage freedom in Europe will be 
granted from April 1997).
3See Bauer [1987] for a definition of hub-and-spoke' routin'g. For a description of 
some European hub-and-spoke networks, see Nero [1994].
4 However, in the short run, given industry and/or regulatory rigidities observed at 
the European level, this assumption is not too restrictive.
5Nero [1994] found, for example, that in 1993 the dom estic market shares (capac­




























































































Figure 1: Two simple linked hub-and-spoke networks
3. The two flag-carriers operate one intra-European route, on which 
they are assumed to provide a homogeneous service6 7. On this route, 
I will assume different degrees of duopolistic ' cross-border compe­
tition using a quantity setting strategy.
4. For computational convenience, I assume symmetric airlines, i.e., 
they use the same technology8, they operate symmetric networks, 
in particular the legs, l =  1 ,..,5  of Figure 1 all have the same 
distance. Moreover, airlines face symmetric demand functions.
Figure 1 shows two simple linked hub-and-spoke networks operated 
by two airlines, Airline 1 in country 1 and Airline 2 in country 2. Cities 
A ,B  and H belong to country 1, whereas cities Z, Y  and 5  belong to 
country 2. Therefore, a total of 6 cities are involved in this structure, 
implying 15 different city-pairs or markets9. Because of their central
6 European airlines offer very similar ranges of services on intra-European routes.
7It should be mentioned that the drawback of this two country/two airline model' 
is that it fails to explicitly take fifth freedom competition into account, i.e., the ability 
of a third  flag-carrier to serve this intra-European route. However, Nero [1994] found 
that among the 103 intra-European city-pairs operated by Swissair in 1993, 99 are 
served by at m ost two airlines, i.e., 96%. Similar figures are found for Austrian 
Airlines and KLM ■ So "  .
8 Actually, it should be noticed that most European flag-carriers use similar aircraft.




























































































locations, cities H and S serve as the hub for Airline 1 and Airline 2 
networks, respectively10.
In a seminal paper. Caves et al. [1984] have shown that airlines 
achieve important returns to  density within a given network. Re­
turns to density arise when an increase of the volume of transportation 
services11 w ithin a given netw ork is more important than the associ­
ated increase in costs. It should be noticed that, in the airline literature, 
returns to scale are typically defined as the variation in unit costs with 
respect to proportional changes in both network size (for example by in­
creasing the cities served) and the provision of transportation services, 
holding density constant. Similarly, the economies of scope measure the. 
cost advantage of jointly providing a large number of diversified products 
(city-pairs) as against specialising in the production of a single product 
(subadditivity criterion). Since the different scenarios analysed in this pa­
per may affect the density achieved within a given network, only returns 
to density are considered hereafter12.
Recent theoretical papers have shown that hub-and-spoke networks 
are optimal transportation routing13. In particular, Hendricks et al. 
[1992] have shown that if there are economies of density, the optimal 
network has the hub-and-spoke characteristic. In fact, by consolidating 
the connecting passengers with the same origin but different destinations 
(or vice versa) on the same route (spoke), the airline gains, principally, 
two kinds of advantages14:
• It increases the density of traffic along each spoke. Therefore, it 
can use aircraft more intensively by increasing the load factor (rate 
of capacity utilisation) and/or using larger, more efficient airplanes.
'"Cities H and S are, most of the time, the capitals of each country.
''Passengers and/or freight.
12 For a recent survey on the ” economies of scale” in the airline industry, see Antoniou 
[1991]. Levine [1987] provides a general discussion of indivisibilities arising in this 
industry.
13See, for example, Starr & Stinchcombe [1992].





























































































In both cases, the unit cost per passenger transported declines10.
• The potential increase in frequency15 6 (for example, two flights per 
day instead of one) along each spoke may increase demand and 
therefore density. However, to the extent that this indirect cost 
advantage is less important, I avoid dealing with it in the present 
paper.
In summary, in the absence of returns to density, airlines would 
provide nonstop connections between each pair of cities, for example be­
tween A and S. In the presence of such returns, airlines have an incentive 
to channel passengers through the hub airport, H in the previous exam­
ple. In other words, it is profit maximising to operate one stop  services 
between A and S, for example.
In this paper. I assume that, because of the presence of returns to 
density, Airline 1 operates aircraft on three legs: leg 1.2 and 3. A similar 
structure is assumed for Airline 2, which operates aircraft on leg 3.4 and
5. Leg 3 represents the intra-European leg. It connects the two hub 
airports, H  and 5. Given bilateral agreements, it follows that this leg 
is served by b oth  airlines. Airline 1 and Airline 2 operate two domestic 
legs, leg 1 and 2 and leg 4 and 5, respectively. On these routes, each 
airline is a m onopolist. Therefore, in this model:
• Peripheral cities (A and B in country 1 and Z and 1" in country 2) 
are connected through the hub airport, i.e., with a one stop service.
• Similarly, country 1(2) peripheral cities are connected to country 
2(1) cities with at least one stop service.
Actually, although the model may seem quite restrictive, there is 
an empirical evidence that most nonstop intra-European services are pro­
vided from hub airports (for example Vienna, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, 
etc.).
15Oum fc Tretheway [1990] and recently Starr & Stinchcombe [1992] suggested that 
the addition of a new city in this system can stimulate traffic density on the other 
links of the hub, generating further economies.




























































































I assume that the demand is symmetric across city-pairs. Conse­
quently, the inverse demand function for round-trip travel in any given 
city-pair market ij is given by P(Q;y), with Qy representing the number 
of round-trip passengers in the market y .  Accordingly, Qij represents the' 
number of passengers travelling from city i to city j  and back, plus the 
number of passengers travelling from city j  to city i and back. Further­
more, I assume a limited demand for international services in the sense 
that: D(Qaz) =  D(QAY) =  D (Q BZ) =  D(QBY) =  0. Put it another 
way, there is no demand between cross-border peripheral cities. While 
gaining in simplicity17, the model captures the following feature: most 
intra-European traffic flows stop at hub airports. This remark is par­
ticularly relevant for central Europe, where capitals attract most leisure 
and business travellers. In addition, because the change of carrier implies 
higher risks of missing a connection18 (often associated with the change of 
terminal in hubs airports and/or the lack of flight coordination between 
carriers) or of losing baggage, I assume that a passenger originating its 
journey in A and willing to fly to city S, for example, will choose the same 
carrier, i.e., Airline 1. These travellers’ preferences ensure each airline the’ 
ability to transport their connecting passengers on the HS leg. Airline 1, 
for example, will carry all the QAs and QBs passengers. Similarly, Airline 
2 will carry all the Qzs and Qys travellers.
Given the common distance of the legs of Figure 1 ,1 assume a com­
mon cost function, Ci(Qi), applying to  each o f  the legs, l =  1, ..,5. 
Therefore, this cost function gives the round-trip cost of carrying Qi trav­
ellers on one leg. From the previous assumptions, it follows that Qi rep­
resent both local as well as connecting passengers. On leg 1, for example, 
aircraft carry both local, i.e., A to H  passengers, as well as connecting, i.e., 
with the same origin but with different destinations, passengers19. In this 
case, Qi=\ would correspond to Qah +  Qab +  Qas, he., all traffic routing 
through leg 1. The cost function allows for increasing returns to density 
stemming from hubbing operations. Put differently, the cost function’
17The model can be reduced to 11 different city-pairs.
18See Carlton et al. [1980] for example.





























































































reflects the cost complementarity arising from producing a bunch of air 
transportation services (products) in a hub-and-spoke network. Conse­
quently, Ci(Qi) satisfies the following properties: Ci(Qi) >  0, C[(Qi) > 0 
and C"(Qi) <  0.
Following Brueckner & Spiller [1991], I adopt the following inverse 
demand and cost specifications:
where Qi is the traffic volume of the relevant city-pairs markets routing' 
through leg l and 6 >  O20.
Consequently, the intercept of the demand function in (1), a. is 
identical for all city-pairs markets. This is equivalent to assuming that 
the cities are similar in size. By eliminating differences in size between 
cities, this assumption allows us to highlight the effects of the network 
structure and of the returns to density on the equilibria in the different 
competition scenarios. It should be noticed that the demand for travel­
ling in the ij market does not depend upon prices in any of the other 
markets21. For simplicity, fixed costs are assumed to be zero under this 
cost specification. Moreover, (2) reflects both ground and flight operating 
costs of transporting a given amount of passengers on a given leg22. The 
extent of increasing returns to density is measured by 9 in (2). Notice 
that constant returns to density would imply 9 =  0. From (2), it should, 
be noticed that, as long that 9 ^  0, the marginal cost of the leg is inferior 
to its (declining) average cost23.
20 But not too large, see below.
21 The idea is that customers who wish to travel from city i to j  have no desire to 
travel any where else in the network.
22 This assumption implies ground and flight costs to be proportional, which is real­
istic if the fuel price is stable.
23Alternatively, it can be verified that the cost elasticity, c^Qi)' ls less t l̂an
Qij j with i ,j  =  A, B, H, S, i ^ j  for Airline 1 
2 1 with i .j  = Y, Z.H.S. i /  j  for Airline 2 (1)
and with a >  0;
with / =  1,2,3 for Airline 1 



























































































Ill The Collusive Agreement Solution
In order to analyse the effects of liberalisation, I first develop the car­
tel solution as a bench mark case. This case corresponds closely to the 
pre-liberalisation case. Under the assumption of (explicit) collusive agree­
ment, Airline 1 and Airline 2 form a cartel on the HS market. Therefore, 
on this city-pair, the cartel provides a quantity so as to maximize joint 
profit24. On the other markets, each airline behaves as a monopolist. 
Given these assumptions, the Airline 1 profit function, IIi, is
ITi = P{Qah)Qah +  P{Qab)Qab + P{Qbh)Qbh +  P(Qas)Qas 
+P(Qbs)Qbs +  P{Qhs)Qhs ~ C\(Qah + Qab +  Qas) 
—C2{Qbh + Qab + Qbs) — Cz (Qhs + Qas + Qbs)•
or expressing it explicitly,
III (a _  QâJL}QAH +  (a -  Q-^-)Qab + (a -  )Qbh
+(a -  -̂ t̂ -)Qas +  (a — ~^^)Qbs + (a
—(Qah  +  Qab  +  Qas -  
—(Q bh  +  Qab  +  Qbs -
2 1 v ~  2 
9(Qah +  Qab +  Qa s )2 , 
2 J 
Q(Qbh  +  Qab  +  Qbs) 2 ,
Qhs +  Qhs )n i )Whs
- ( Q bs +  Qas +  QlHS ~ 9(QBS + Qf  + Qk s )2 (3).
From (3), we observe that Airline 1 revenues are generated from its 
6 markets, whereas its costs correspond to aircraft flown on three legs. 
Notice that in the HS market, the demand function is given by P (Q h s ) —
a _  wjth Qhs — Q1hs -i- Q2h s, i.e., the total quantity is the
sum of the individual quota offered by Airline 1 and Airline 2, respectively. 
Similarly, the Airline 2 profit function, n 2, is
n 2 = P(Qzs)Qzs + P(Qzy)Qzy +  P(Qys)Qys +  P(Qz h)Qzh 
+P(Qy h )Qyh +  P(Qhs)Qhs ~ C4(Qzs + Qzy + Qzh) 
- C s(Qys + Qyz + Qy h) -  Ci(Q2HS + Qzh + Qy h )• (4)




























































































Joint profit maximisation boils down to maximising IIcar =  IIi +  II2. 
Assuming interior solutions, the solution of the cartel problem implies 


































o -  Qah =  1 -  9(Qah + Qab .+ Qa s ) (0)
“  -  Qab  =  2 -  20QAb -  8(Qah +  Qas +  Q bh + Qb s ) (6) 
a -  Qbh = 1 — 8{Qbh +  Qab  +  Qb s ) (7)
“  ~ Qas = 2 -  28Qas -  9{Qah +  Qab +  Qhs + Qb s ) (8) 
<* -  Qbs =  2 -  28Qbs -  8(Qbh +  Qab  +  Q hs +  Qa s ) (9) 
a ~ Q\js ~ Q hs =  1 — ^(Qns + Qbs +  Qa s ) (10)
<* — Qzs =  1 -  8(Qzs + Qzy +  Qz h ) (11)
a. -  Qzy  —2 -  29Qzy -  8(Qzs +  Qzh +  Qys +  Qy h ) (12) 
a — Qys  =  1 — 9(Qy s  +  Qy z  +  Qyh) (13)
Q -  Qzh =  2 -  28Qzh -  0(Qzs + Qzy  + Qhs +  Qy h ) (14). 
“  -  Qyh  = 2 -  29Qyh  -  9(Qys  +  Qy z  + Qhs + Qz h ) (15) 
ot — Qhs ~ Qhs =  1 — 8(Q2hs + Qzh +  Qy h )- (16)
The economic interpretation of (5)-(16) is simple. Optimality re­
quires to equalise the marginal revenue (LHS) in city-pair market ij  with 
its associated marginal cost (RHS). Solving the system (5)-( 16) yields the 
optimal quantities. It should be pointed out that, given the symmetry, 
in equilibrium, it must be the case that QXHS =  Qjfs, i.e., the traffic on 
the intra-European market is equally divided among both airlines. The 
optimal quantities25 are
Q hs — Q2hs =  Q o" -
(1 — 2 # ) (a ( l  — 26) — 1) 
166>2 -  136» +  2 (17)
25 For the sake of simplicity these quantities are indexed but they should not be 




























































































(2 — 3 0 ) (a ( l  — 20) — 1) 
1602 - 1 3 0  +  2
(18).Q a h  — Q b h  =  Qzs — Q y s  =  Qcar
Q as  = Q b s  - Q z h  =  Q y h  = Q T r
Q a b  =  Q z y  =  Q T
a (2  — 20 — 2d2) + 7 0  — 4 
1602 -  130 +  2
(19)
a (2  -  0 -  402) +  60 - 4  
1602 -  130 +  2
( 2 0 )
Therefore, the symmetric structure reduces the joint profit maximi­
sation problem to a four variables problem. This symmetric structure 
provides a simple way to check the necessary and sufficient second or­
der conditions. In the Appendix (Section IX .l), it is shown that interior 
solutions exist for 0 <  13~ ^  =  0.2062 (see (53)). Similarly, it can be 
shown that in equilibrium, in order to have both positive quantities and 
marginal revenues(costs), the following inequalities hold
4 - 7 0  2 -  30
2 -  20 -  202 < Q <  0 (6 -1 0 0 ) ' (_1)
Hereafter, I assume that, in equilibrium, both (21) and (53) are satisfied. 
Under these conditions, it is straightforward to verify that (17)-(20) are 
increasing in a.
P roposition  1 As long as 0 £ [0,0.2062] and inequalities (21) hold, we 
have that >  2Q(,ar. PROOF see Appendix.
Therefore, the model shows that, for a given nonstop  market, i.e., a 
market implying only one leg, the quantity provided by each airline on its 
monopoly domestic city-pair market (i.e., <5iar) is larger than the quantity 
provided by the cartel, i.e., Q\fS +  Q2HS =  2<5“ r, on the intra-European 
HS market. This result shows that, for a given nonstop market, output 
or traffic is more restricted under the collusive arrangement than it is 
under monopoly. As a consequence, ceteris paribus, the price is higher 
on the intra-European (HS) market.
P roposition  2 As long as 0 £ [0,0.2062] and inequalities (21) hold, we 




























































































Consequently, for a given one stop  market, i.e., a market imply­
ing two legs, the quantity provided on markets connecting two domestic 
peripheral cities (markets A B ,Z Y ) is higher than the quantity provided 
on markets connecting a peripheral city and the foreign hub (markets 
A S,B S,ZH ,YH ). Therefore, although markets AB  and ZY  are served 
by monopoly airlines, consumers are better off on these markets in com­
parison with markets affected by the collusive agreement. This result is 
due to the presence of increasing returns to density. Since each airline has 
to share the HS market, under increasing returns to density, lower traffic 
per airline on that leg raises the marginal cost on the leg and generates a 
negative externality on markets using that leg (AS.BS.ZH. YH ). This 
explains why, for a given one stop market, the quantity provided by the 
monopoly airline (QlaT) is higher than the quantity in a market routing 
through the collusive leg (Q^v).
C orollary: Under the (limit) case of constant returns to density 
(6 =  0). (21) implies that 2 <  a <  oo26, we have that 2Qq t =  Q1ar =  
q -  1. and Q f r =  Qc3ar =  a -  2.
Therefore, total traffic in the HS market, 2Qoar, is equal to the 
traffic of the nonstop domestic markets, Qlar. This means that, for a 
given nonstop market, the cartel and the monopoly outcomes are the 
same. What is the intuitive explanation of this result ? On its domestic 
route, when 6 >  0, the monopolist airline fully recognises it, setting a 
larger quantity than the quantity provided on the collusive route. Notice 
also that, as expected, in longer journey markets, i.e., markets using- 
two legs {Qc3t and Q3lT), the traffic is less (higher costs imply, ceteris 
paribus, higher price and lower demand). Again, the previous argument 
may explain why the traffic is the same (O f"- =  Qcz r)i whereas under 
6 ^  0 these quantities are different (see Proposition 2).
In addition, in equilibrium, the model prevents arbitrage oppor­
tunities from arising, which is a useful requirement in a transportation 
network model. In effect, in order to prevent arbitrage opportunities, 
fares must be set such that the sum of the individual fare for the two legs




























































































of the trip (e.g., AH  plus HS) is larger than the fare for a given city-pair 
market involving one stop (e.g., AS). If this would not be the case, it 
would be profitable for the traveller to purchase the tickets separately. 
Given the inverse demand function (1) and (17)-(20), it follows that the 
arbitrage conditions are reduced to the following inequalities
P(Q ?r) + P(2Qc0ar)>  P (Q ?r) and 2P (Q fr) > F (Q fr). (22)
It can be shown that these inequalities are verified when the first order 
conditions (5)-( 16) and the second order conditions (53) (see Appendix) 
are satisfied.
IV The ” Competitive” Solution
The introduction of the Third Package of regulations (January 1993) will 
not promote airline competition on all EC routes in the same way. On 
the one hand, access to domestic routes is restricted since cabotage traffic 
rights will still be severely regulated until 1997. As a consequence, flag- 
carriers’ hinterlands are unlikely to disappear within the Third Package. 
On the other hand, intra-European routes are the subject of more com­
petitive rules. Firstly, any EC certificated airline can provide capacity be­
tween two countries (fifth freedom competition). Secondly, the Commis- 
sion is going to seriously prevent airlines from making bilateral collusive 
agreements on capacity and fares. In the short run, while the former de­
cision is likely to only affect the most profitable intra-European routes27, 
the latter decision is likely to affect m any intra-European routes28. Con­
sequently, this section focuses on this second effect.
I assume that both flag-carriers, Airline 1 and Airline 2, compete 
in the intra-European market HS, while continuing to exercise monopoly 
power in their domestic markets. Therefore, although tacit collusion 
could not, a priori, be excluded under the new regulatory environment,
27The sunk costs on new routes are likely to be high. According to Betts & Gardner 
[1992], European airlines estimate the introduction of a new route to cost £  10-12 
million. See also Levine [1987] for a discussion on sunk cost in this industry.
28Therefore, the drawback of this two country/two airline model (it fails to explicitly 




























































































I assume that both airlines act individually (i.e., noncooperatively) on 
the HS  market. Airlines are assumed to play a Cournot static ("one 
shot” ) game. Two lines of argument are in favour of a quantity set­
ting model. Firstly, Cournot behaviour in the airline industry has found 
empirical support in the literature (Reiss & Spiller [1989]. Brander L 
Zhang [1990,1993]). Brander & Zhang’s [1990] paper is particularly rele­
vant for our analysis since they estimate conjectural variation parameters 
for duopoly airline routes29. They found that, in general, the Cournot 
assumption is consistent with the data30. Secondly, to the extent that, 
the two flag-carriers have been keeping, until recently, stable bilateral 
agreements, it is unlikely that they would compete more vigorously (e.g.. 
Bertrand behaviour) than Cournot competition would imply. More im­
portantly, perhaps, is the general perception among airline managers that 
capacity (and therefore frequency) is the key variable in this industry. It 
is not surprising that American Airlines Chairman. Robert Crandall, re­
cently reported that
’’Capacity is how we compete in this business. ”31
In order to provide a simple comparison with the cartel solution. I 
assume the same symmetric networks (Figure 1) and same demand as­
sumptions on travellers’ preferences for intra-European air services. Con­
sequently, the Airline 1 problem reduces to maximising (3). Similarly, 
the Airline 2 problem is to maximise its profit function (4). However, un­
der the ’’ competitive” assumption each individual airline has to select a 
quantity of output to maximise its own profit. The Cournot behaviourial 
assumption implies that when Airline 1(2) maximises its own profit, it 
takes Airline’s 2(1) quantity as given. The symmetry of the model allows 
the analysis to concentrate on the symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium
29Their data set consists of 33 duopoly routes served by American Airlines and. 
United Airlines in Chicago in 1985.
30Their related paper of 1993 examines the dynamic pattern of firm conduct. Al­
though they are able to reject the hypothesis that the dynamic path of quantities and 
prices was characterised by mere repetition of the Cournot one shot solution, they 
suggest that data are more consistent with a quantity setting regime-switching model.




























































































where Q]jS =  Q2HS. For simplicity, I work out the solution in terms of Air­
line 1. Given (1) and (2), it follows that the maximisation of (3) implies 
that first order conditions (5)-(9) be satisfied and that, in addition,
=  0 =*• a -  Qxs - -Q 2hs =  1 -  0{Qhs +  Q bs +  Qas) {23) OLJjjs z
Notice that the marginal revenue in (23) is now different from the marginal 
revenue in (10), reflecting the Cournot assumption. Solving the system 
(5)-(9) and (23) yields the following Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities
Q 1hs =  Q o mp 
Qah  =  Qbh  =  QclOTnp 
Qas — Q bs =  Qc2°mp
(2 — 4 0 ) (a ( l  — 20) — 1) 
2602 - 2 0 0  +  3
(3 — 56>)(or(l — 2(9) — 1) 
2602 -  200 +  3
a (3  — 30 — 4 0 2) +  110 — 6 




Qab =  Qc3omp
a (3  — 20 — 602) +  100 — 6 
2602 -  200 +  3
(27)
In equilibrium, it can be shown that Q2HS — Qlorr>p,Q zs — Q ys — 
Qc°mp, Q zh  =  Q yh  — Q cr p, Q zy  =  g r p, i-e., Airline’s 2 optimal quan­
tities are similar.
As previously, this symmetric structure provides a simple way to 
check the second order conditions. In the Appendix (Section IX.4), it 
is shown that interior solutions exist for 6 <  =  0.2042 (see Ap­
pendix (56)). Furthermore, in equilibrium, in order to have both positive 
quantities and marginal revenues (costs), the following inequalities must
hold
6 -1 1 0
< a <
3 - 5 0
(28)
3 -  30 -  402 '  0 (9 -1 6 0 ) '
Hereafter, I assume that, in equilibrium, both (28) and (56) are satisfied. 
Under these conditions, it is straightforward to verify that (24)-(27) are 
increasing in a.
P roposition  3 As long as 9 G [0,0.2042] and inequalities (28) hold, we 




























































































Therefore, for a given nonstop  market, i.e., a market implying only 
one leg, the model shows that the total quantity provided on the com­
petitive intra-European market (2Qc0omp) is larger than the quantity pro­
vided on the monopoly domestic market {Qc{ mp). In other words, this 
result shows that, for a given nonstop market, output or traffic is more 
restricted under monopoly than it is under Cournot competition. As a 
consequence, ceteris paribus, the price is higher on the domestic market.
It should be noticed that, as expected, Proposition 3 is the reverse of 
Proposition 1.
P roposition  4 As long as 9 £ [0,0.2042] and inequalities (28) hold, we 
have that Qc3 mp > Qc2ornp. PROOF see Appendix.
Consequently, although market AB is served by Airline 1 as a mo­
nopolist, the traffic between these two domestic peripheral cities is higher 
than the traffic between a peripheral city and the foreign hub (markets 
.45 and BS ). This counter intuitive result is due to the presence of in­
creasing returns to density. On the HS market, Airline 1 has to divide 
the market with its competitor. In the presence of increasing returns to 
density, lower traffic per airline on the HS leg raises the marginal cost on 
the leg and generates a negative externality on markets using that leg (.45 
and BS). This explains why, for a given one stop  market, the quantity 
provided by the monopoly airline (Qc3ar) is higher than the quantity in a' 
market routing through the competitive segment (Q2ar).
C orollary : Under the (limit) case of constant returns to den­
sity (6 =  0), {'28) implies that 2 <  a <  oo, we have that 2QCQTnp =  
*^=11, Qc1omp =  a  -  1, and Qc°mp =  Qc3omp =  a -  2.
It follows that, in equilibrium, total traffic in the HS market (2Qc0omp). 
is always greater than the traffic of the nonstop domestic markets {QC\Tnp). 
independent of the degree of returns to density. This result is an impor­
tant feature of the model and departs from the previous result under 
collusive agreements (Section III), where we found that 2Qĉ r =  Q\[ar 
when 9 =  0. It can be noticed that, as expected, in longer journey mar­




























































































is less than in shorter journey markets. Moreover, under constant returns 
to density, we have that Qr2ornp =  Qc3omp. This latter result is similar to 
the result derived in the collusive solution (Section III).
As previously, it can be shown that arbitrage conditions hold when 
(28) and (56) are satisfied. Therefore, in equilibrium,
P [Q clornp) +  P(2Qc0omp) > P (Q c2omp) and 2P{Q\omp) > P (Q c3omp). (29)
V  The Collusive versus the ” Competitive” 
Solution
Given the results obtained under the cartel solution (Section III) and the 
’’ competitive” solution (Section IV), it would be interesting to compare 
both scenarios, in order to assess which solution is socially preferable. In 
fact, until now I have compared quantities w ithin a given solution. In this 
section, I provide a comparison of quantities between the two solutions 
and I measure the change in welfare arising from the more competitive 
environment32. Therefore, these results could provide an assessment of 
the new regulatory rules introduced in the EC airline industry.
A proper comparison implies the restriction of a in order to satisfy 
both solutions. In fact, in order to satisfy (21) and (28), the following 
inequalities must hold
4 - 7 0   ̂ _ 3 - 5 0
2 -  202 -  20 <  Q < 0 (9 -1 6 0 ) '
(30)
Hereafter, I assume that both (30) and (56) are satisfied in equilibrium.
P roposition  5 As long as 0 £ [0,0.2042] and inequalities (30) hold, we 
have that 2 Qc0omp >  2 Qc0ar,Q c°mp > Q\ar ,Q 2mp >  Q T  and Q fmp >  Q ?T. 
Therefore, given the specifications of the model, we have that the ’’compet­
itive’’ solution provides a strictly greater quantity in the HS market and 
greater or equal quantities in all other markets. PROOF see Appendix.




























































































C orollary : Under the (limit) case, of constant returns to d e n ­
sity (9 =  0), (30) implies that 2 < a <  oc, we have that 2Ql°mp >
2Qc0ar,Q c°rnp =  Q ?r,Q T np =  QT-, and Q T np =  Q T ■
This is an important theoretical result. Competition on the intra- 
European leg not only increases the quantity provided on that market, 
but also increases the quantity on all other markets as soon as returns 
to density are increasing. This outcome occurs whenever the demand is 
weak or strong, so long as a satisfies (30). Therefore, all consumers of 
the network benefit from a greater competition on the intra-European 
route. This positive externality arises since the greater quantity on the 
HS market (as a whole) lowers the marginal cost on the leg, which in 
turn implies a lower price for the markets routing through the competitive 
segment. It should be stressed that this positive externality occurs also 
on markets not directly affected by the intra-European route, i.e.. the. 
purely domestic markets. This result tends to show that competition on 
one important market33 has widespread positive effects throughout the 
network. A misrepresentation of such effects would provide an important 
bias in the analysis of the EC airline liberalisation.
The next step is to compute the net social welfare (NSW) arising 
from both solutions. Net social welfare is defined as the sum of consumers' 
surplus (CS) on each market ij plus the economic profit of the industry34. 
In the case of the linear inverse demand (1), the CS is represented in 
Figure 2. Therefore, in a given market ij, the CS is equal to
C S - h ^ 3 t M  = ( | ) t  (3D
Given (31) and (17)-(20), we can show that the consumer surplus' 
throughout the network under the collusive solution, CScar, is given by 
the following expression
IOcar)2
CScar(9,a) = ( Q D 2 +  ( Q D 2 + (Q T )2 + (32)
33It is important because it connects two hub airports.
34For the sake of comparison with the merger solution (Section VI), I consider NSW  




























































































Figure 2: Linear Demand and Consumer Surplus
P
a2(22 -  9261 +  17162 -  20863 +  12864) -  a(68 -  2246 +  18462) +  58 -  1926 +  16062'
2(1662 -  136 +  2)2
Similarly, given (31) and (24)-(27), the consumer surplus throughout 
the network under the ’’ competitive” solution, CScomp, is
inc°mp\2
C S comp(9.a )  =  (,Qlomp)2 +  ( Q f mp)2 +  ( Q™mp)2 +  — %  ■ ~ ( 33)
a 2 (53 -  2446 +  49262 -  6246»3 +  39664 )
2(2662 -  206 +  3 )2 +
—a (1 60  -  5766 +  53662 -  326s ) +  134 -  4766 +  42462 
2(2662 -  206 +  3)2
Given (1), (2), ((51) see Appendix) and the optimal quantities (17)-. 
(20), the economic profit of the industry under the collusive arrangement 
is
n car(6,a) a 2 ( l l  -  236 +  862) -  a (3 4  -  566) +  29 -  486 
1662 -  136 -e 2
(34)
Similarly, the profit under the ’’ competitive” solution is twice Air­
line’s 1 profit ((54) see Appendix). Given the optimal quantities (24)-(27), 
this expression is equal to
rrcomp/a _  a2(49-4380+119602-12O403+33204) ,
11 \u i a ) (26«2-20«+3)2 '
—a(152—12920+314402 —2360(?3)-f 130—11O604-269602 —2028#3 / o r \




























































































Since we have demonstrated that quantities under the competitive 
solution are greater than under the collusive solution, it must be the case 
that CScornp > CScar. Of course, the profit of the industry is larger 
under the collusive agreement. Therefore, the comparison of the NSW 
reflects these two contrasting effects. Given (32), (33), (34) and (35). 
we can show that N SW comp — NSW car > 0, for any 0 6 [0.0.2042] and 
a satisfying (30). Figure 3 (see Appendix) illustrates this difference in a 
three dimension space. The positive surface indicates that the NSW under 
the ’‘ competitive” solution is greater than the NSW under the collusive 
solution. This difference is increasing in the return to density and the 
appropriate demand parameters.
By setting 6 — 0. i.e., constant returns to density, the NSW is 
reduced to a single variable problem and it becomes straightforward to 
show that, in equilibrium. .YSVUcomp — A’STTcar >  0. In effect, we have 
that
cscomp + ncamp > cscar + ncor
I oI q 2 -  464a +  394 _ 6 6 a 2 -  204a +  174 
18 >  8 
a 2 — 2a +  1 >  0
(a  — l ) 2 >  0 which is always true.
_Y S U 'comp -  .Y S W car >  0
The results obtained in this section indicate that, given the as­
sumptions of the model, it would be socially desirable to set a more 
competitive environment on intra-European routes when airlines operate 
hub-and-spoke networks. Therefore, from a theoretical point of view, the 
establishment of more competition on the intra-European routes'*0, even 
w ithout new entrants, should be encouraged.
VI The Merger Solution
Until the late 80s., the strategic response from the EC airlines to an in­
creasingly liberalised, competitive worldwide market, was essentially that 35




























































































of cooperation. This cooperation took mainly the form of (technical) 
collaboration and partnership among established European flag-carriers 
together with major airlines from the U.S. and other continents. Recently,' 
the current trend of consolidation in the European airline industry sug­
gests that the flag-carriers’ strategies are 1) to absorb the small, princi­
pally domestic, regional airlines and 2) to form cross-border flag-carriers 
mergers36. Whereas the main goal for taking over regional airlines is to 
’’ feed” central hub airports by regional traffic, incentives for cross-border 
mergers are more directly related to achieving higher levels of efficiency. 
This is particularly true for mergers involving medium-sized flag-carriers, 
where specialists and airline managers recognize that the prospects for 
cost savings are impressive3'. Since the second type of merger is likely to 
become an important issue in the EC airline industry, this section will deal 
with the cross-border merger problem. Given the framework developed 
in Section IV, let us suppose that, in response to a more liberal environ­
ment, the two hub-and-spoke airlines (Airline 1 and Airline 2) decide to 
merge and form a (cross-border) common entity. Should the EC regula-' 
tory authority approve the merger of these two flag-carriers and therefore 
authorize the formation of a monopoly over the entire network? What 
are the effects of the elimination of competition on the intra-European 
leg? What are the spillovers on the other markets? The purpose of the 
following analysis is to explore these important questions. *•
36 Air France Chairman, B. Attali, recently reported that: Cannibalism has become 
a strategic model in this industry. (Fortune Magazine, 2 Nov. 1992, p.26.)
3| For an airline specialist view see, for example, the Economist, 13 Nov. 1993, p.70. 
and H. Carnegy & I. Rodger in Financial Times, 24 Nov. 1993. According to an 
internal Swissair’s document, the cost savings from a merger with Austrian Airlines, 
SAS and KLM (the project is known as Alcazar) could account for 1100 million Ecus in 
1997. According to KLM  Annual Report (1992/93), this hypothetical merger should 
principally
• achieve a greater efficiency and lower cost levels at the four airlines,
• strengthen the joint market position of the partners based on various European 
hubs,
• form a customer-driven global route network.
It should be stressed that the negotiations for this merger failed last winter, but 




























































































Farell & Shapiro [1990] demonstrated that, in general, horizontal 
mergers in Cournot oligopoly raise prices if they generate no synergies 
between the merging firms. The important theoretical analysis of airline 
mergers is due to Brueckner & Spiller [1991]. Under some conditions, 
they show that 1) the merger of a hub airline and a nonhub competitor 
may raise the social welfare, and 2) in a network, the merger may lead 
to welfare gains outside the markets which are of primary concern with 
the increase in market power. Borenstein [1990] has studied the effect 
on airfares of two U.S. airlines mergers: the TWA-Ozark and Northwest- 
Republic mergers. He found a significant increase in relative airfares on 
routes affected by the Northwest-Republic merger, but no evidence of fare 
increases associated with the TWA-Ozark merger. Kim & Singal's [1993] 
paper provides insights into how market power and efficiency gains inter-- 
act in U.S. airline mergers. They find that, in general, airline mergers 
during the 1985-1988 sample period led to higher fares on routes affected 
by the merger, creating wealth transfers from consumers. However, ac­
cording to these authors, most of the effect of increased market power 
takes place during the merger discussion. Once the merger is completed, 
they find, in fact, that the efficiency gains offset much of the impact of 
increased market power, at least when mergers do not involve financially 
distressed airlines. In effect, they report that (p.567)
’’Efficiency gains start to kick in after merger completion, 
mainly for routes with potential sources o f direct operating syner­
gies, such as routes on which the merging firms have common hubs 
or provide overlapping service. For these routes, efficiency gains 
offset much of the impact of increased market power. ”
In the present model, the potential efficiency gains stemming from 
the merger are simply captured by the increase in traffic densities on the 
overlapping intra-European leg. Following Kim & Singal's [1993] termi­
nology, because prior to the merger the airlines operated an overlapping 
leg without a common hub, it is likely that ”in the air” synergies38 arise 
from the use of fewer aircraft and/or a better load factor, i.e., capacity





























































































utilisation39. Therefore, the interesting question is: how much economies 
of density (and corresponding demand level) are needed for a merger to 
increase output and reduce price with respect to the ’’ competitive” so­
lution ? Putting it another way, how much efficiency gains (in terms of 
economies of density) should the merger generate in order to offset the 
effects of exercising additional market power by virtue of reducing the 
number of competitors by one?
Let us assume that because of the network complementarity (see’ 
Figure 1), the merged airline, Airline M , operates on the same network 
structure. In particular, it maintains the two separate and specialised 
hubs40. Again, in order to provide a simple comparison with the previous 
solutions, I assume the same demand and cost specifications as in (1) 
and (2) except that now i =  A ,B ,H ,S ,Z ,Y , j  =  A ,B ,H ,S ,Z ,Y , (with 
i ^  j )  and l =  1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 , in order to properly take the new merger struc­
ture into account. I maintain also the same assumptions on travellers’ 
preferences for intra-European air services (see Section II). In particu­
lar, it is assumed that D(QAz) — D(QAY) =  D (Q Bz) — D(QBy) =  0. 
Consequently, the Airline M  problem reduces to maximizing
n M =  P {Q a h )Q ah +  P (Q a b )Q ab +  P {Q b h )Q bh  +  P {Q as)Q as 
+ P (Q b s )Q bs +  P {Q h s )Qhs +  P(Qsz)Qsz +  P {Q z h )Qzh 
+ P {Q z y )Qzy  +  P {Q y h )Qyh  +  P (Q y s )Qys 
—C\{Qah +  Qab +  Qa s ) -  C2(Qbh  +  Qab  +  Qb s )
39In this model, since both airlines are equally efficient, a merger does not offer an 
opportunity to rationalise production in the traditional sense, i.e., without changing 
the total level of output, to shift output to the more efficient airline. Nor is it the case 
that by combining their aircraft (capital) they would produce more efficiently, since 
as pointed out by Brueckner & Spiller [1991] the existence of an active rental market 
for aircraft gives no particular advantage associated with acquiring another airline’s 
capital. O f course, it is clear that the existence of complementary resources (capital) 
could enhance the efficiency gains stemming from the merger. Increases in efficiency 
•can arise from economies of scale or scope related to aircraft maintenance, marketing 
and sales services, management, extended network, airport gates acquisition, etc.. To 
the extent that the model only captures the economies of density, it is likely that the 
efficiency gains provided in this section are underestimated.
40 For instance, city H could serve sis the hub for the southern markets, whereas city 
5  could serve as the hub for the northern markets. See Oum & Tretheway [1990] for 




























































































-C 3 (Q hs +  Qas +  Qbs +  Qzh  +  Qy h )
—C i{Q zs +  Qzy  +  Qz h ) — C$(Qys  +  Qyh  +  Qy z )- (36)
where HM is the profit function of the merged airline. It should be’ 
noticed from (36) that Airline M  generates its revenue from 11 city-pair 
markets whereas its costs correspond to aircraft flown on five different 
legs. It should be stressed also that on the intra-European leg, Airline M  
carries now all the travellers of the HS market (Q h s ) as well as all the 
connecting travellers (Q as +  Q bs +  Q zh  +  Q y h ) using the intra-European 
leg. Assuming interior solutions, the solution of Airline M  implies that 
the first order conditions (5), (6), (7), (11), (12), (13) be satisfied and 
that in addition,
ot -  Qas =  2 -  26Qas
—8(Qah +  Qab +  Qhs +  Qbs +  Qzh +  Qyh ) (37)
a — Qbs =  2 — 29Qgs
—9(Qbh + Qab +  Qhs +  Qas + Qzh + Qy h ) (38)
a -  Qhs =  1 -  8(Qhs +  Qas + Qbs +  Qzh +  Qy h ) (39).
a -  Qzh =  2 -  28Qzh
- 9(Qzs +  Qzy  +  Qyh  +  Q hs +  Qas + Qb s ) (40)
a -  Qyh  = 2 -  28QYfl
- 0 {Q ys  + Qzy  +  Qzh + Qhs +  Qas +  Qb s )- (41)
It should be pointed out that the new first order conditions (37)-(41) are 
related to markets routing through the HS leg. Solving the system con­
stituted by (5 )-(7 ),(ll)-(13 ) and (37)-(41) yields the optimal quantities 
offered by the merged airline. These optimal quantities are
Q hs =  Q of =
a ( l  -  40 +  8<?2) -  1
(42)
1602 - 9 0  +  1
Qah  =  Qbh  =  Q zs =  Qys =  Q f  =
a ( l -  60 +  60 2) +  40 - 1
(43)
1602 -  90 +  1
Qas =  Qbs — Qzh  =  Qyh  =  Q ¥  =
(1 — 2 0 ) (a ( l  +  0) — 2)
(44)











































































































( l - 4 6 ) (a ( l  +  6 ) - 2 )  
16e2 - 9 6  + 1Qab  =  Qzy  =  Qz —
Consequently, the Airline M  problem is reduced to a four variables prob­
lem. It should be mentioned that, in contrast to the previous solutions, 
(42) corresponds to the total traffic in the HS city-pair market. In the 
Appendix (Section IX.8), it is shown that the second order conditions are 
satisfied as long as 6 <  — 0.1524 (see Appendix (59)). Moreover,
in order to have both positive quantities and marginal revenues, we must 
ensure that in equilibrium the following inequalities hold
2 1
------- <  a < --------------- .
1 + 6  6(5 — 86)
(46)
Hereafter, I assume that both (46) and (59) are satisfied in equilibrium. 
Under these conditions, it is straightforward to verify that (42)-(45) are 
increasing in the demand parameter a.
P roposition  6 As long as 6 € [0,0.1524] and inequalities (46) hold, we 
have that Q(f > . PROOF see Appendix.
This result suggests that, for a given nonstop  market, the traffic 
transported on the HS city-pair market is higher than the traffic in any 
other city-pair market. This intuitive result can be explained by the 
position of the cities H  and S in the network. Airline M , as unique 
operator of the central leg of the network (the leg 3 connects the two 
hubs), is able to achieve higher economies of density, reducing, ceteris 
paribus, the cost of this leg. Actually, it is interesting to note that the 
’’ competitive” solution offered the same qualitative result (see Proposition 
3).
P roposition  7 As long as 6 6 [0,0.1524] and inequalities (46) hold, we 
have that Q% > ■ PROOF see Appendix.
Consequently, for a given one stop  market, the quantity provided 
on markets connecting two peripheral cities (markets A B .Z Y ) is lower 




























































































the foreign hub (markets A S,B S,ZH ,YH ). Therefore, consumers are. 
ceteris paribus, better off on these latter markets. This intuitive result 
is due to the presence of increasing returns to traffic density. Due to its 
monopoly position in the HS market, Airline M  is able to transport a 
higher traffic level on this market, which generates a positive externality 
on markets using that leg. It is interesting to note that Proposition 7 is the 
reverse of Proposition 2 and Proposition 4, where we found that, under 
the collusive and the ’’ competitive” solutions, consumers were better off 
in the former markets, i.e.. AB  and Z Y .
C orollary : Under the (limit) case of constant returns to density 
(6 =  0), (46) implies that 2 < a <  oo, we have that Qq =  Qf1 =  a  — 1. 
and Q2 — Q3 — a — 2.
Therefore, in equilibrium, when 6 =  0, Airline M  provides the same 
quantity on the nonstop city-pairs markets (Q 1̂ =  Qf1). As expected, 
a lower quantity is provided in longer journey markets, i.e.. on markets 
routing through two legs. Moreover, in these latter markets, the quantity 
provided is identical (Q 1̂ =  Q ^).
Finally, it can easily be shown that, in equilibrium,
P(Qi) +  P(Qo) > P (Q ? )  and 2P ( Q f ) > P ( Q f ) ,  (47)
i.e., the arbitrage conditions hold if the first order conditions (5)-(7),(11 )-• 
(13) and (37)-(41) and the second order conditions (59) are satisfied.
VII The Merger versus the ” Competitive” 
Solution
In order to give an answer to the questions arising from the preceding 
section, I propose to compare the ’’ competitive” solution (Section IV) 
with the merger solution (Section VI). To this end, I follow the same 
methodology developed in Section V. A proper comparison implies the 




























































































and (46), the following inequalities must hold
6 — 116» 1
3 — 30 — 402 < Q <  0 ( 5 - 8 0 ) '  ( )
Notice that (48) is satisfied for 8 E [0,0.1479]. Consequently, restricting 
8 to [0,0.1479], ensures that all the appropriate conditions of the model,, 
i.e., (48), (56) and (59), are satisfied in equilibrium.
P roposition  8 As long as 9 6 [0,0.1479] and inequalities (J8) hold, we 
have that Q f  > Qc°mp,Q% > Q™mv-Qi > Ql°mp and Qtf >  (<)2Qc0omp. 
PROOF see Appendix.
Therefore, given the specification of the model, we have an ambigu­
ous result in the HS market which depends on a complex relation between 
the returns to density and the demand parameters. It can be shown that 
when the returns to density are sufficiently strong, i.e., 9 E [0.093,0.1479] 
and the demand satisfies41 a* < a <  , the merger solution pro­
vides a greater quantity on the HS market. In all the other markets, the 
merger solution provides greater or equal quantities with respect to the- 
’’ competitive” solution, for all values of a and 9. This result highlights 
the importance of the network structure in the analysis of the airline in­
dustry. In effect, it suggests that the merger may lead to greater(lower) 
quantities(prices) on the markets which are not directly affected by an 
increase in market power, i.e., {Q ^ ,Q ^  and Q ^). Brueckner & Spiller 
[1991] found a similar result using another hub-and-spoke structure.
C orollary : Under the (limit) case of constant returns to density 
(0 =  0), (48) implies that 2 < a <  oo, we have that Q 1̂ < 2Qc0ornp, Q 1̂ =
QCO'mp QM =  QComP' ^  Q M =  QComp ̂
Therefore, the ’’ competitive” solution provides a greater quantity on 
the market where competition is effective {HS).  On the other markets, 
both solutions provide the same quantities. It should be noticed that 
under the absence of increasing returns to density, the merger solution




























































































mimics the cartel outcome. The comparison of the merger and the "com ­
petitive” solutions is shown in Table I (see Appendix) for some selected 
values of 6 up to 0.147.
This second theoretical result deserves some comments. In effect, 
the model suggests that, for some variety of parameters, the merger so­
lution provides a greater quantity on all city-pairs markets. To under­
stand the intuition behind this result, it is important to remember that 
in the ’’ competitive" solution, competition is really effective on the intra- 
European market HSi2. This means that on all the other markets, only 
one airline actually provides air services. Therefore, in these latter mar­
kets, the merger and the ’’ competitive” solutions are, basically, similar in 
terms of market power. The merged airline provides a larger quantity in 
these markets, because it is able to exploit the increasing returns to den­
sity on the intra-European leg HS. In fact, the decrease of the marginal 
cost on that leg has positive effects on the other markets throughout the. 
network (even in those markets which are not routing through the HS 
leg). Matters are quite different in the HS  city-pair market, where the 
market power changes in function of the solution analysed. Not surpris­
ingly, the model suggests that when the efficiency gains (through the 
returns to density) are sufficiently important (0.0925 < 9 <  0.1479) and 
the demand is relatively strong (a > a*), consumers on the HS market 
are better off under the merger solution. Conversely, when the returns 
to density are relatively weak (9 <  0.0925), the ’’ competitive” outcome is 
preferred from the HS consumers’ point of view since the quantity(price) 
is larger(lower). It should be noticed that, when 9 <  0.0925 (9 > 0.139). 
the ’’ competitive" (merger) outcome is preferred w hatever the demand 
is weak or strong42 3. Hence, these results emphasize the key role played 
by the returns to density.
The final desirability of the merger should be assessed after compar­
ing the NSW under the merger and the ’’ competitive” solutions. Given 
(31) and (42)-(45), the consumer surplus throughout the network under
42 By assumption, the model excludes cabotage competition.





























































































the merger solution, CSM, equals
CSM(0,a) = i9 l)L  +  (QM)2 +  (QM)2+ ( Q l ?
a 2( l l  -  760 + 21402 -  28803 + 25604)
4(166>2 -  90 + l )2 +
-a (34  -  1926» + 32O02) + 29 -  1600 +  25602 
4(1602 -  90 +  l )2
Given (36) and the optimal quantities (42)-(45), the economic profit of 
Airline M , hence of the industry, is
n M(6,a) = a2( l l  -  380 + 1602) -  a(34 -  960) + 29 -  800 
2(1602 — 90 +  1)
(50)
The NSW under the merger solution, N SW M, is obtained by adding (49) 
and (50). Unfortunately, the difference between N SW M and N SW comp 
has not a closed form solution. This difference depends in a complex 
relation between the parameters of the model (0 and a). The comparison 
of N SW comp and N SW M is shown in Table II (see Appendix) for some 
selected values of 0 up to 0.14. It is interesting to note that N SW M is 
superior to N SW cornp when the low  returns to density are balanced with 
a relatively high demand. When the returns to density are relatively 
important (9 > 0.1), Table II shows that the merger solution is always 
preferable from the welfare point of view.
Figure ??  (see Appendix) illustrates this difference in the three 
dimension space. As expected, the ’’ competitive” solution dominates the 
merger solution if the returns to density and the demand are relatively 
weak. An increase in 0 sustained by a relatively high demand reverses the 
previous result. When 0 >  0.1 there is no ambiguity, the merger outcome 
is socially preferable.
By setting 0 =  0, the NSW is reduced to a single variable problem. 
As expected, in this case the ’’ competitive” solution dominates the merger 
solution. In effect, we have that
Nswcomp -  n s w m > o -t=4> cscomp + ucomp > csM + nM




























































































= >  q2 — 2a +  1 >  0
=>■ (a — l ) 2 >  0 which is always true.
The results obtained in this section give some insights into the opportu­
nity of a socially desirable cross-border merger. In particular, this model 
shows that a merger between two airlines organised in hub-and-spoke net­
works may increase the social welfare when the efficiency gains (obtained 
through the returns to density) are relatively important44. Consequently, 
under increasing returns to density, the threat of monopolisation through 
the merger should not be of primary concern to EC antitrust authori­
ties. In addition, given that the markets which benefit from the merger 
(QfC Q$r and Ql1) are outside the market of direct concern with an in­
crease in market power (Qa),  exclusive focus on gains and losses in this 
latter market may have the effect of blocking a socially desirable cross- 
border merger. This model also suggests that purely domestic consumers 
should not. a priori, be harmed by such a cross-border merger. Finally, 
it should be noticed that, although it is not a matter of concern to this 
section, the merger solution dominates the collusive solution for all the 
values of 6 and a allowed by the model.
VIII Conclusion
This paper provides an analysis of the intra-European airline competition 
within an explicit (hub-and-spoke) network. Using the quantity setting 
paradigm, optimal solutions are derived for various competition scenarios. 
The model highlights that under sufficient increasing returns to density, 
the threat of monopolisation through the merger should not be of primary 
concern to EC antitrust authorities. The model rather suggests that 
EC authorities should ban bilateral collusive agreements between flag- 
carriers.
This analysis could be extended in the following different directions.
44 Recently, Roller & Sickles [1993] argued that competition policy in Europe should 
allow mergers or strategic alliances to be formed if they do translate in costs sav­





























































































Firstly, it would be interesting to see if these results are confirmed under a 
price setting strategy with product (air service) differentiation. Secondly, 
a market specific demand parameter (ay,-) could be introduced. Thirdly, 
this model could analyse the potential effects of cabotage competition.. 
In that case, it is assumed that access to domestic routes is open to 
foreign flag-carriers. Consequently, flag-carriers loose their ’’ hinterland’' 
and duopolistic competition arises throughout the network. Given that 
airlines face each other in several markets, it would be interesting to see 
how they could compete less vigorously in one market due to the fear of 
retaliation in another (multimarket contact argument).
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IX Appendix
IX .1 Second Order Conditions for the Collusive 
Solution
In fact, given (17)-(20), the cartel profit. IIcar =  Ilj +  r^ can be simplified 
to the following expression
nc 2 (a  -  Q0)Qo +  4 (o  -  ^ - )Q X +  4 (o  -  ^  
—4(Qi + Q 2 +  Q3 - ^ 1 + Q22 + Q3)2) 
- 2 ( Q o +  2 Q 2 ~  e { Q o  +  2 Q 2 ) 2 ). (51)
From (51), it turns out that second order conditions reduce to the fol­
lowing symmetric Hessian matrix
0 - 2 0 20 0
0 2(0 - 1) 20 20
20 20 2(3 0 -  1) 20
0 20 20 2 0 - 1
The maximisation of (51) requires (52) to be negative semidefinite. This 
condition is verified if and only if the principal minor determinants of 
order q have sign (—1)? for q =  1 ,2,3,4  4S. It-can be easily verified that 
the sign of the principal minor determinants of (52) properly alternates if





























































































This holds for any 6 <  13~^“  =  0.2062 46. It should be noticed that the 
quadratic function (53) corresponds to the denominator of the optimal 
quantities (17)-(20).
IX .2 Proof of Proposition 1
QTr > 2Qc0ar
(2 -  30)(a(l -  20) -  1) ^ (2 -  40)(a(l -  29) -  1) 
1602 -  130 + 2 -  1602 -1 3 0  + 2
0 > 0 since q > ----- - under (21).
1 -2 0  V
IX .3 Proof of Proposition 2
Q T  > Q T
q (2 -  402 -  0) +  60 -  4 q (2 -  202 -  20) +  70 - 4
1602 -  130 +  2 -  1602 -  130 +  2
0(q(1 -20)  -  1) > 0
0 > 0 since a >  ̂ under (21).
IX .4 Second Order Conditions for the ” Competi­
tive” Solution
As previously, using (1) and (2) and (24)-(27), the Airline 1 problem (3) 
reduces to maximising the following expression
n. (a — Qo)Qo +  2(a ■
- 22(Qi +  Qi +  <?3
^ ) Q i + 2 ( a - ^ ) Q 2 +  ( a - ^ ) Q 3 
0(<2i +  Q2 +  Q3)2 .
~{Qo +  2Q2 — 0(Qo + 2Q2)2 (54)
46Given that this quadratic function admits two roots, I assume that 6 G [0,0.2062], 





























































































Consequently, the second order conditions from (54) reduce to the fol­
lowing symmetric Hessian matrix
9 - 2 0 29 0
0 2 (0 -1 ) 29 29
29 26» 2(39-1) 29
0 29 29 2 9 -1
It should be notice that this matrix is similar to (52). As a consequence, 
(55) is negative semidefinite if (53) is verified, i.e., if 166*2 — 138 +  2 > 
0. For computational convenience, I restrict 9 in order to have positive 
quantities. This is, in part, satisfied if the denominator in (24)-(27) is 
positive, i.e., if
2692 -  200 +  3 > 0. (56)
In turn, this implies 9 <  20~ ^  =  0.2042 4‘ .
IX .5 Proof of Proposition 3
2Qc0omp > Q\omp
(4 -  80)(c*(l -  29) -  1)  ̂ (3 -  50)(a(l -  29) -  1) 
2692 -  209 + 3 > 2692 -  209 + 3
(4 — 89) > (3 — 59) since a > -—1— under (28),
1 —  2 u
IX .6 Proof of Proposition 4
(~\Comp -v f\CompV3 d. V2
a(3 -  2 9 -  692) +  100 -  6 ^ a(3 -  39 -  492) +  1161-6 
2692 -  209 + 3 ~ 2692 -  200 +  3
0(a(l — 29) — 1) > 0
9 > 0 since a >  ̂ under (28). 47
47 Actually, it can be noticed that this figure is very close to the figure of condition 




























































































IX .7 Proof of Proposition 5
2 Qc0omp > 2 Q r
QComp >  g e a r
Qcomp >  g car
2
\̂Comp>Q car3
(4 -  85)(a(l -  25) -  1) _ (2 -  45)(a(l -  2 9 ) -  1)
2652 -  20 9  +  2 >  1652 -1 3 5  +  2
2(1652 -  135 + 2) > 2652 -  205 +  3 
652 — 65 +  1 > 0 which is satisfied for 5 € [0.0.2113].
(3 -  55)(a(l -  25) -  1) ^ (2 -  35)(q(1 -  25) -  1)
2652 -  205 +  3 ~ 1652 -  135 +  2
(3 -  55)(1652 -  135 +  2) > (2 -  35)(2652 -  205 +  3)
52(1 -  25) > 0
a(3  -  35 -  452) +  115 -  6 ^  a(2 -  252 -  25) +  75 -  4 
2652 -  205 +  3 “  1652 -  135 +  2
5(1 -  25)(1 -  35)[a(l -  25) -  1] >  0
a >  t— - ^ 2  which is true under (30).
1 — 2o
a(3 -  25 -  652) +  105 -  6 ^  a(2 -  452 -  5) +  65 -  4 
2652 -  205 +  3 -  1652 -  135 +  2
252(1 -  25)[a(l - 2 5 )  -  1] >  0
a  >  ------ r j  which is true under (30).
1 —  2 u
IX .8 Second Order Conditions for the Merger So­
lution
Using (42)-(45), the Airline M  problem (36) can be simplified to the 
following expression
nM = Q o \ Q\, Q2,(a -  —  )Q0 + 4(a -  y -)Q i + 4(« -  ^)<32 +  2(a ■ Qz )Qs
-4(Qi +  Q2 +  Q3 —9(Q 1 +  Q2 + Q3)2






























































































Although similar to the joint profit maximisation problem (51), it is im­
portant to stress that (57) corresponds to a different expression. It turns 
out that the second order conditions from (57) reduce to the following 
symmetric Hessian matrix
0 - 1 0 40 0
0 4(0  -  1) 40 40
40 40 4 ( 5 0 - 1 ) 40
0 40 40 2 ( 2 0 - 1 )
It can be shown that (58) is negative semidefinite if
1602 -  90 +  1 >  0. (59)
This holds for any 0 <  * 9~3'^  =  0.152 4 48. It should be pointed out that 
(59) corresponds to the denominator of the optimal quantities (42)-(45).
IX .9 Proof of Proposition 6
Qtf > Qi
a (l - 4 9  +  802) -  1) ^ ( a ( l  -  60 +  682) +  4 9 -  1) 
1692 - 9 0  +  1 -  1692 -  90 +  1
2
6 >  0 since a > ------- - under (46).1 + 9
IX .10 Proof of Proposition 7
q ¥  > Qz
(1 — 2 0 ) (a ( l  + 6 )  — 2)
1602 - 9 0  +  1
' . 2
9 >  0 since a  >  ------
1 +
(1 — 4 0 ) (a ( l  +  0) — 2) 
. 1602 - 9 0 + 1
under (46).




























































































IX .11 Proof of Proposition 8
Q? >Q
comp1
q M > Qcomp
Q i > Q comp3
QoW > 2QSomp
a(l -  60 +  602 ^ (3 -  50)(a(l -  20) -  1)
1602 - 9 0 + 1  “  2602 -  200 + 3
a(7 -  100 -  402) -  13 + 240 > 0 
13 -  240
a — 5— 1712— 72k which is always true under (48). 7 — lUo —
(1 -  20)(a(l + 0) -  2) ^ a(3 -  30 -  402) + 110 - 6  
1602 -  90+ 1 “  2602 -  200 + 3
n(7 -  100 -  402) -  13 + 240 > 0 
13 -  240
n > - — — 7----T27 which is always true under (48).7 -1 O 0 -4 0 2
(1 -  40)(a(l +  0) -  2) ^ a(3 -  20 -  602) +  100 - 6  
1602 -  90+ 1 -  2602 -  200 +  3
a(7 -  100 -  402) -  13 +  240 > 0 
13-240
a >  - — ——— which is always true under (48). 7 — lUo — 4ĉ
a ( l - 4 0  +  802) 1 (4 — 80)(a(l — 20) — 1)
a >
1602 -  90 +  1 '  2602 -  200 +  3
1-24+11O 02 -  12803
































































































9 =  0 2 < a < oo Q" < = g;omp,Qf = Q"mp,Q« = Q lomr
0 = 0.02 1.967 < a < 10.33 Q« < 2Q lomr q M >  QOOmp gM > Q comp gM > Qcomr
0 = 0.04 1.935 < a < 5.342 Qf* < 2Q“ mp qM > Q“ mp gM > > Q„mp
0 = 0.06 1.903 < a < 3.687 Q »  < 2 > <?;°mp,Q" > Q"mp,Q« > Q'°mp
0 =  0.08 1.872 < a < 2.867 <?« < 2Q"mp q«  > > «r"p
0 = 0.09 1.857 < a < 2.596 < 2Q"mp qM > geomp gM > gt°">P gM > g«»*l>
0 =  0.10 1.842 < a  < 2.380 Q" < 2Q”mp if a < 2.234 
Q”  > 2Q'°r"p if a > 2.234
q M > Qcomp gM > g i r  gli ?
0 = 0.11 1.827 < a < 2.207 Qo1 < 2Q"mp if a < 2.026 
Q" > 2Q”mp if a > 2.026
gM > gĴ P.gM > g""p,Q« > Q"mp
0 -  0.12 1.812 < a < 2.063 Q" < 2Q”mp if a < 1.905 
Q tf > 2Q l°m” if a > 1.905
gM > Q“ mp,g« > g'“mp,g« > Q” mp
0 = 0.13 1.798 < a < 1.943 QM < 2Q"mp if a < 1.829 
Q" > 2Q'°mp if a > 1.829
gM > gtomp gM > gtomp gM > gcomp
0 =  0.14 1.783 < a < 1.841 Q« > 2Q” mp gM > gJ"mp gM > Q ^ p q M > g'°>"1>
0 = 0.147 1.773 < a < 1.779 Q" > 2g'°mp gM > Q^omp gM > g^P.gM > Q"”'"
Table II: NSW c°ml1 versus N SW M
Proper solutions require Outcome
0 =  0 2 < a  < oo NSWc°mp > JVSWM
0 =  0.02 1.967 < a  < 10.33 NSWc°m’’ > N S W m  if a  < 3.418 
NSWc°mp < JVSWM if a  > 3.418
0 =  0.04 1.935 <  a  < 5.342 ySWcomp > NSWm i[a< 2.314
NSWcomp < iVSWM if a  > 2.314
0 =  0.06 1.903 <  a  < 3.687 A'5W comp > N S W m if a  < 2.058 
NSWcomj> < N S W m if a  > 2.058
0 =  0.08 1.872 < a  < 2.867 NSWcomp > N S W m if a  < 1.934 
NSWc°mp < N S W m  if a  > 1.934
0 =  0.10 1.842 < a < 2.380 f f s r ,mp > N S W m if a <  1.853 
NSWcomp < N S W m if a  > 1.853
0 =  0.11 1.827 < a  < 2.207 NSW,omr < N S W m
0 =  0.12 1.812 < a < 2.063 NSWcomp < N S W m
0 =  0.13 1.798 < a  < 1.943 NSWoomp <  NSWM
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